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 1 
The bearable lightness of being  
 Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false 
 proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the widest 
 word in the philosophical vocabulary.1
 
 
1 Questions 
 As a great ontologist once observed2
 These are, I think, relatively uncontentious points. But there is more to be said 
that is bound to be much more controversial. I shall try to say some of it, focusing 
mainly on two issues—the relations between ontology and logical grammar and those 
between ontology and modality. Both, of course, are issues on which much has been 
said and on which there is no general agreement. In regard to the first, some have seen 
ontology as—in one way or another, and for one reason or another—inseparable from 
the logical analysis of language, while others have vehemently opposed any such 
linkage and viewed it as a fundamental philosophical error to suppose that questions 
about the analysis of language can have any bearing on questions about the nature of 
non-linguistic reality
, one can state the ontological problem 
very briefly, in just three words—‘What is there?’—and answer it even more briefly, 
in one—‘Everything’. Breviloquence is indeed a virtue, but more—as Quine 
recognised—needs to be said. For one thing, the question is to be understood as 
asking after what kinds of things there are, as opposed to an inventory of the 
individual things belonging to them. And even then, it is really only, save perhaps in 
some special cases, with very general kinds that philosophers are concerned. 
Aardvarks and ammonites are each perfectly good general kinds of thing, but their 
existence is of no special interest to the philosopher, as distinct from the zoologist or 
geologist. We are, by contrast, much interested in whether there are numbers, or sets, 
or material objects, or arbitrary mereological sums, for example. A plausible 
explanation why the latter, but not the former, are foci of philosophical concern is that 
the former are, if not themselves categories, the most important and representative 
general kinds lying within a category.  
3
                                                 
1 Russell 1903, p.43 
. Here I shall explain and defend a broadly Fregean version of 
2 W.V.Quine, in the opening paragraph Quine 1948. Quine thought  the short answer correct, and I 
agree, but it isn’t uncontroversial—at least, it is not uncontroversial if one takes the question to be 
about what exists. See, for example, Graham Priest 2005, ch.5, following Routley 1980, ch.3 and 1982. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain why I disagree with them. 
3 Proponents of a more or less tight connection between language, or conceptual scheme, and ontology 
include philosophers of otherwise markedly divergent persuasions, such as Frege, Quine, Carnap, and 
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the view that questions about what kinds of things there are are inseparable from, and 
in one way posterior to, questions about the logical analysis of language. In regard to 
the second issue, philosophers have sometimes viewed recourse to modality as a 
means of avoiding ontological commitment, i.e. as offering a way to avoid asserting 
the existence problematic (usually abstract) entities of some kind or other4. Of course, 
this approach will seem to promise a clean philosophical gain only to the extent that 
one regards modal notions as in good standing. Many philosophers have taken a less 
sanguine view of modality, and have held that talk of possibilities and necessities—if 
not to be rejected altogether as unintelligible or at least too unclear for serious 
philosophical use, or otherwise mortally sinful—must somehow be reduced, or 
explained away, in other terms. To those with troubled consciences, recourse to 
modality may be seen as at best achieving ontological economy at an unacceptable 
cost in ‘ideology’—we merely swap uncomfortable ontological commitments for 
acceptance of irremediably obscure notions of necessity and possibility. As against 
sceptics about modality, I hold that modal notions are not irrecoverably unclear, that 
their use is indispensable to an adequate account of the logic and methodology of 
systematic thought about the world, and that modal facts are both objective and 
irreducible5
 
. As against those who see modality as a way of avoiding ontological 
commitment, I shall suggest that a better perspective on ontological issues enables us 
to see that facts about what kinds of things there are are already essentially modal, 
and that when we appreciate the way in which they are so, we should no longer feel 
under pressure to seek ways of eliminating ontological commitments by modalizing 
them (i.e. burying them under modal operators). 
 The central question of ontology, then, is: what kinds of things are there? 
                                                                                                                                           
Putnam—for an illuminating discussion of Frege’s views, see Dummett  1973, ch.4 (especially p.56ff); 
for the others, see especially Quine 1969, Carnap 1950, and Putnam 1981, ch.3. Prominent among the 
opponents has been Michael Devitt—see especially Devitt 1984, passim, and especially chs.1,4, and 14    
4 An early presentation—and perhaps the origin—of this idea can be found in Hilary Putnam’s paper 
‘Mathematics without foundations’ (Putnam 1967. A well-known development of Putnam’s idea is the 
modal version of eliminative structuralism presented by Geoffrey Hellman (in Hellman 1989), 
according to which elementary arithmetic, for example, is not a theory about an infinite sequence of 
particular abstract objects (the natural numbers 0,1,2, …), but merely tells us what would be true of the 
elements of any infinite sequence of a certain kind, if there were one—there is, on this account, no 
commitment to the actual existence of any such sequence, only to possible existence. 
5 It lies beyond the scope of this paper to argue for these very substantial claims. I attempt a partial 
defence of the second in Hale 1999. I hope soon to publish a fuller defence of all three claims, but for 
now they must remain largely undefended assumptions.    
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I am using ‘thing’ here as Russell says he is going to use ‘term’ in the quotation at the 
head of this paper—as the widest word in the philosophical vocabulary, with no 
implication of membership in any particular ontological category. Accordingly, one 
way of taking our general question is as asking what basic or fundamental categories 
or types of entity we should recognize—where candidates include objects, 
individuals, particulars, substances, properties, relations, universals, events, 
processes, states of affairs, facts, etc. Clearly we may also—presupposing some such 
categorization—ask more specific, but still highly general questions, e.g. What kinds 
of objects (or properties, events,…) are there? Are there abstract as well as concrete 
objects? Are there mental properties (or events) as well as physical ones? etc. Once 
we spell out our central question along these lines, it becomes evident that we face a 
number of prior methodological questions. Prominent among them6
How are the various ontological categories to be understood?  
 are:  
How may questions about what kinds of things there are be best approached and 
resolved?  
 In what follows, I shall focus largely on the first of these methodological 
questions. How, in particular, should we explain the notions of object and property 
(or particular and universal)? In what terms should the distinction between them be 
drawn? And how, in particular, are distinctions among ontological categories or types 
related to distinctions at the level of language, between different logical categories or 
types of expression? 
 As anticipated, I shall recommend a broadly Fregean answer—that is, an 
answer according to which ontological categorization (save in special cases, 
categorization of non-linguistic entities) is dependent upon and derivative from prior 
logical categorization of expressions7
                                                 
6 Obviously there are also questions about how distinctions invoked in the more specific questions—
e.g. between the abstract and the concrete, or between the mental and the physical—should be drawn.  
. I shall assume that central among the 
categories to which things belong are those of object, property and relation. 
Properties and relations, I assume, belong to different types or levels, according as 
they are properties of, or relations among, objects, or properties of, or relations 
7 For important earlier discussion, see Dummett 1973, pp.54-7 and Wright 1983, pp.10-15. See also 
Hale 1987, ch.1 and Hale & Wright 2001, pp.7-11      
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among, properties of objects, and so on. I intend my use of the term ‘object’ to cover 
what have perhaps more commonly, in traditional discussions, been called 
‘particulars’ or ‘individuals’. Similarly, I intend no significant distinction between 
properties and relations and what, in traditional discussions, are perhaps most 
commonly called ‘universals’. In focusing on these categories, I am not, of course, 
suggesting that they are the only categories we should recognize, or that other 
categories may somehow be reduced to them. On the contrary, it seems clear that one 
should recognize at least events and processes, and substances (in the sense, roughly, 
of (kinds of) stuff) as separate and independent categories. Perhaps one should also 
recognize a category of facts or states of affairs. It is not my aim here to adjudicate 
these questions. I omit discussion of them principally because I think that everything I 
want to say can be said by focusing on objects, properties and relations. Of course, it 
would be a serious weakness in the approach I shall be commending if it cannot be 
applied to other ontological categories, but I can see no reason to think it cannot be 
extended to them.  
 The plan for the remainder of this essay is as follows. I shall begin (sections 2-
4) with a rough and preliminary statement of the conception of objects, properties, 
etc., which I think we should adopt for the purposes of a general philosophical 
enquiry into what kinds of things there are. This rough statement will be good enough 
to enable me (section 5) to confront a general line of objection to it which views the 
linkage it forges between ontology and the logical analysis of language as deeply 
misguided, on the ground that it confuses questions about the nature of non-linguistic 
reality with quite separate questions about the structure of our thought and talk. 
Although I believe this line of objection is itself fundamentally misdirected, I agree 
that a satisfactory response to it must include a more careful and qualified statement 
of the approach I favour (sections 6-7). I shall then turn (section 8) to some further 
difficulties confronting that approach, and try to explain how it may be refined to deal 
with them. I shall conclude (section 9) with some general observations on the 
resulting conception of ontology and ontological commitment.   
 
2. Objects 
 If we are to avoid prejudging the outcome of an enquiry into what general 
kinds of objects there are, we require a neutral and completely general conception of 
what an object is. Evidently it is no good saying that an object is whatever occupies a 
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specific continuous region of space throughout a period of time, or of space-time. 
Setting aside any further difficulties this might be thought to raise—for example, 
about the ontological status and individuation of regions of space-time—this would 
simply beg the question against views according to which there are abstract objects, 
or objects that are the mereological sums of the contents of discontinuous regions of 
space-time. The need to avoid foreclosing, in one way or another, on the question 
what kinds of objects there are provides a strong, if not decisive, reason for explaining 
the general notion of an object in this way: an object is anything that is, or can be, an 
object of singular or identifying thought or reference. The appearance of circularity in 
this explanation is to some extent merely apparent. In so far as it results from the use 
of the term ‘object’ in the explanans, it is merely apparent. An object of thought or 
reference is just whatever is thought about, or referred to. Things other than objects, 
in the intended sense, can be objects of thought and reference. When I think that 
Socrates was wise, I am—as F.P.Ramsey insisted—thinking about wisdom just as 
much as about Socrates8. But I doubt that circularity is entirely avoidable. What does 
the real work in the proposed explanation is the notion of singular or identifying 
thought or reference, and I doubt that this can be explained without appealing to some 
notion—such as that of numerical as opposed to qualitative identity—which cannot 
itself be properly explained without reference to the target notion of a particular 
object. As Quine says, ‘the whole apparatus’—i.e. the apparatus of individuation or 
‘objective reference’: ‘our articles and pronouns, our singular and plural, our copula, 
our identity predicate’—‘is interdependent’9. If he is right, circularity is unavoidable. 
But circularity is not necessarily vicious, and is not so—or so I would claim—in this 
case10
 Objects, then, according to the present proposal, are the (typically) non-
linguistic correlates of the devices of singular reference. The proposal is broadly 
.  
                                                 
8 For Ramsey, of course, this was a prelude to his sceptical rejection of the particular/universal 
distinction as resting upon a ‘great muddle’—see Ramsey 1925, p.134. Ramsey’s scepticism is 
discussed in Strawson 1959, ch.5 and Dummett 1973, pp.61-9. See also Hale 2006  
9 Quine 1960, p53. I am not forgetting that Quine continues ‘… and the very notion of a term is as 
provincial to our culture as are those associated devices’. I shall explain later why we do not need to 
follow Quine into the jungle of relativism. 
10 In part, the point here is just the one often made in similar contexts, that at a basic level, explanation 
in terms of more fundamental ideas may be impossible, so that we can do no more than exhibit 
interconnections between concepts. But the circularity can be mitigated also by providing operationally 
independent tests for singular terms—see below, section 4.  
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Fregean in two principal respects. First, it follows Frege in taking the division of non-
linguistic entities into different types or categories to be dependent upon a prior  
categorization of the types of expressions by means of which we refer to them. 
Second, and more specifically, it takes proper names in Frege’s inclusive sense—
singular terms—as the primary means by which we refer to objects. In this second 
respect, the proposal ostensibly diverges quite sharply from Quine’s well-known view 
on ontological commitment, encapsulated in his slogan ‘to be is to be the value of a 
variable’. Since for Quine, the only admissible variables are those of first-order 
quantification, his slogan identifies being an object with being a value of a variable. 
This divergence from Frege’s view is in one way11
 
 merely superficial. At a deeper 
level, there is agreement—Quine, like Frege, effectively identifies being an object 
with being an object of singular reference. It is merely that, because he holds constant 
singular terms to be always eliminable by means of an extension of Russell’s theory 
of definite descriptions, he takes the bound variables of first-order quantification to be 
the sole means by which we refer to objects. 
3. Properties and relations 
 A much deeper divergence between Quine’s approach to ontology and the 
broadly Fregean approach I am recommending is apparent as soon as we turn to the 
question of the nature and existence of properties.  For Quine, the sole bearers of 
ontological commitment are the only vehicles of singular reference that he 
recognizes—in a regimented language, the bound variables of first-order 
quantification. Had Quine not persuaded himself of the eliminability of constant 
singular terms, he would presumably have allowed that ontological commitment 
might equally well be carried by the use of such terms—so that we would be 
committed to the existence of something wise as much by our asserting ‘Socrates is 
wise’ as by ‘Someone is wise’, or ‘Something uniquely socratizes and is wise’. But 
the devices of singular reference—definite reference by means of constant singular 
terms, or indefinite reference by means of quantifiers—would remain the sole 
vehicles of ontological commitment. It is—to put the same point in a way that brings 
out its massive ontological significance—simply an assumption of Quine’s whole 
                                                 
11 Quine’s doctrine of ontological relativity is another matter—q.v. infra section 7. 
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approach12 that expressions of other types, such as predicates like ‘is wise’ or ‘weighs 
more than’, etc., do not refer or stand for entities of any kind, so that our use of them 
carries no existential commitment13. Thus for Quine, the issue whether there are—or 
whether to acknowledge the existence of—properties (or, as he usually prefers to say, 
attributes) has to be understood as the question whether we should take seriously the 
use of abstract nouns such as ‘wisdom’, ‘weight’, etc., as devices of (singular) 
reference14
 The contrast with a broadly Fregean approach could not be greater. Running 
parallel to our Fregean explanation of what objects are, there is a seemingly simple 
and straightforward explanation of what properties and relations are—just as objects 
are what singular terms stand for, so properties and relations are what (one- or more-
place) predicates stand for. More precisely first-level properties, or properties of 
objects, are what first-level predicates stand for—a first-level predicate being any 
expression which, applied to a suitable number of singular terms, yields a sentence. 
Thus assuming ‘Socrates’ and ‘Theaetetus’ to be singular terms, some examples of 
first-level predicates are ‘is wise’ and ‘loves’—the former applying to ‘Socrates’ to 
give ‘Socrates is wise’, and the latter to ‘Socrates’ and ‘Theaetetus’ to give ‘Socrates 
loves Theaetetus’. ‘is wise’ stands for the (ostensibly non-relational) property of 
being wise, ‘loves’ for the relation, or relational property, of loving. With respect to a 
formal language such as that of Frege’s Begriffsschrift, our explanation of first-level 
properties extends straightforwardly upwards to properties of higher-level. Second-
level properties are simply the referents of second-level predicates, these being 
expressions, other than singular terms—including the first-order quantifiers which we 
write ‘∀x …x…’ and ‘∃x…x…’—which may be combined with first-level predicates 
. 
                                                 
12 I am not suggesting the assumption is peculiar to Quine. On the contrary, it was taken for granted—
and not only by those with nominalist sympathies—in virtually all ontological discussion, at least in the 
analytic tradition, during the middle and later decades of the last century. 
13 Hence Quine’s view that higher-order quantification, if not simply unintelligible, is objectionable 
because it introduces new and unwanted existential commitments. The doubtful coherence of this view 
appears as soon as one sets aside the smokescreen of the doctrine of the eliminability of singular 
terms—it would be obviously and grossly implausible to claim that ‘Something is wise’, for example, 
introduces as commitment to the existence of objects of which ‘Socrates is wise’ is wholly innocent. 
On the contrary, it seems plain that quantification into a position in sentences, assuming it carries an 
existential commitment, merely generalises a commitment already borne by the constant expressions—
whether names or predicates—which can occupy those positions and which its bound variables replace. 
For extended discussion, see Rayo & Yablo 2001 and Wright 2007. 
14 Quine contends that we should not, on the grounds that there is no satisfactory account to be had of 
when two such terms stand for the same property or attribute—‘no entity without identity’.  
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to form sentences15. Third- and higher-level properties may be similarly explained. 
With respect to natural languages, the extension of our explanation to cover higher-
level properties and relations is greatly complicated by the fact that generality is 
normally, if not invariably, expressed by means of (indefinite) pronouns or noun-
phrases—and so by expressions of the same surface grammatical category as singular 
terms—regardless of the level of generality involved. Thus the obvious existential 
generalization of ‘Sally and Mary are both flautists’, expressed in the language of 
second-order logic, would be ‘∃F(F(Sally) ∧ F(Mary))’, but to express it in tolerably 
natural English, we must say something like ‘There is something which Sally and 
Mary both are’ or ‘There is some property that Sally and Mary have in common’16
 
. 
Corresponding to this bias against non-nominal quantification, genuine second- and 
higher-level predicates—i.e. incomplete expressions which combine with predicates 
of lower-level to form sentences—are rarely, if ever, to be found in natural languages. 
Thus we cannot achieve a fully general explanation of higher-level properties by 
identifying them as the referents of higher-level predicates. I shall reserve this, and 
some related, difficulties for the Fregean approach for discussion later. First, I want to 
complete my preliminary statement of the approach, and confront a much more 
fundamental and philosophical line of objection to it.   
4. Determining what there is 
 It seems clear that philosophically contested questions about what kinds of 
things there are—such as whether there exist abstract as well as concrete objects 
(numbers and sets, say, as well as plants and animals, particles and forces, etc.), or 
whether there are general properties, and if so, what kinds of there are—are not to be 
settled by any sort of observation or empirical investigation. The adoption of a 
broadly Fregean approach to our first question—how are ontological categories to be 
explained?—encourages, even if it does not actually enforce, an obvious approach to 
our second—how should we determine what kinds of things there are? If entities 
                                                 
15 A fuller account would need to provide for pure second-level relations—i.e. relations whose terms 
are just first-level properties, as illustrated by sentences of the form ∀x(Fx ⊃ Gx), in which the pure 
second level predicate is ∀x(__x ⊃ …x)—and mixed second-level relations—i.e. relations whose terms 
include at least one first-level property and at least one object, as illustrated by ∃x(Fx ∧ x ≠ b ∧ Fb), in 
which the mixed second-level predicate is ∃x(__x ∧ x ≠ … ∧ __...), and which asserts that the property 
F is instantiated by the object b and at least one other object. Similarly for other levels. 
16 Constructions more closely  corresponding to ∃F(Fa ∧ Fb) and ∀F(Fa ⊃ Fb) than ‘There is 
something a and b both are’ and ‘b is everything a is’ would be ‘Somehow a and b’ and ‘Everyhow a, 
thathow b’—an improbable, but nevertheless surely quite intelligible, extension of English as she is. 
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belonging to a certain ontological category just are what expressions of a certain 
logical category stand for, then we can argue for the existence of entities of that kind 
by arguing that there are true statements involving expressions of the relevant kind. If, 
for example, there are true statements incorporating expressions functioning as 
singular terms, then there are objects of some corresponding kind. If the singular 
terms are such that, if they have reference at all, they refer to numbers, there are 
numbers17
 This is, of course, only a rough and preliminary statement. Taken as it stands it 
open to obvious objections. On the one hand, it may appear utterly trivial—since it is 
trivially true, for example, that the number 17 exists if ‘17 exists’ or ‘There is such an 
object as the number 17’ is true. On the other, it may appear clearly false—since it is 
clearly insufficient for the existence of Zeus that ‘The ancient Greeks believed that 
Zeus lived on Mount Olympus’ be true. A more qualified statement would require 
that expressions of the appropriate logical type occur in true statements in which they 
are not embedded in non-factive contexts. Formally, one could block the triviality 
objection by requiring that the relevant true statements be atomic—although this is 
probably a more stringent restriction than is needed. More importantly, the triviality 
objection misses the point of the Fregean approach—it is, of course, trivially true that 
17 exists if ‘17 exists’ is true; but the Fregean point is that the truth of perfectly 
ordinary arithmetical statements, such as ‘17 < 19’ and ‘17 is prime’ suffices for the 
existence of the number 17 (provided that ‘17’ functions as a singular term in them). 
That is, it is not open to us to accept such ordinary arithmetic statements as true, when 
taken at face value, but deny the existence of numbers.  
. If there are true statements involving expressions functioning as 
predicates, then there are properties of some corresponding kind. If the predicates are 
such that, if they stand for anything at all, they stand for mental properties, then there 
are mental properties; and likewise in other cases. Under the Fregean approach, 
questions about the existence of entities of this or that kind are transformed into 
questions about truth and logical form—are there true statements incorporating 
expressions of the appropriate logical type? 
 Two further points should be mentioned, neither of which can be properly 
addressed here. The first is that it is evidently essential, if the Fregean approach to 
settling ontological questions is to be viable, that one be able to recognize expressions 
                                                 
17 This is what, in Hale 1987, I called the Fregean argument (see pp.10-14) 
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as belonging to a given logical category independently of determining whether or not 
there exist entities of the appropriate ontological type to which those expressions 
refer. It must, for example, be possible to recognize an expression as functioning, in a 
given sentential context, as a singular term, without  first determining that there is an 
object for which it stands. Otherwise, we should be involved in an obvious, and 
obviously vicious, form of epistemological circularity—to know that there is an 
object for which a certain expression stands, we would need to know that that 
expression functions as a singular term in a certain true statement, but to know that it 
does so function, we would need to know that there is an object for which, as used in 
that statement, that expression stands. In a Fregean analysis of language, the 
fundamental categories of expression are complete sentences and singular terms 
(Frege’s Eigennamen). First-level predicates raise no special problem, since they are 
simply recognizable as those expressions obtainable from complete sentences by 
omitting a suitable number of occurrences of singular terms. Similarly, logical 
connectives and first-order quantifiers, being further derived categories of expression, 
raise no special problem—a sentential operator is simply any expression resulting 
from a complete sentence by omission of one or more sentences, and a first-order 
quantifier any expression resulting from the omission of a first-level predicate. But for 
the recognition of singular terms, we can rely on no such explanation—we need 
separate criteria, based on features of their use discernible without reliance upon 
knowledge of what, if anything, they stand for. I believe that suitable such criteria can 
be based, as Dummett once proposed, upon patterns of inference distinctive of 
singular terms. Their exact formulation raises a number of difficulties which I cannot 
go into here18
 The second point calling for further discussion is that the Fregean recipe for 
settling ontological questions is entirely neutral on the further question of how we are 
to determine whether there are indeed true statements involving the use of expressions 
of the relevant logical type. One might hold, as Frege himself did, that the truths of 
arithmetic can be known—and hence that at least some existence questions can be 
answered—a priori. But it would, so far as I can see, be entirely consistent with the 
Fregean approach as so far articulated to hold—with Quine, or at least in a Quinean 
. 
                                                 
18 For Dummett’s original proposal, see Dummett 1973, pp.57-69. For further discussion see Hale 
1987, ch.2, Hale 1994 and 1996, Wetzel 1990, Rumfitt 2003, Hale & Wright 2003. Regrettably 
unpublished work by my former student, Paul McCallion, discloses further difficulties, distinct from, 
but closely related to some raised by Ian Rumfitt (op.cit.). I hope to discuss these elsewhere. 
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spirit—that whether or not there are, say, true statements essentially involving 
singular terms for numbers, or sets, should be settled by consideration of what makes 
for the best overall theory that accommodates the data of sensory experience (or as 
much of it as possible), where what counts as the best theory is determined by the 
application broadly pragmatic maxims of simplicity, explanatory power, minimization 
of clashes with experience, and the like. On a view of this kind, questions about what 
kinds of things there are, while not directly answerable by empirical investigation, are 
as much part of the natural scientific enterprise as any others. While my sympathies 
lie with the first of these opposed views, there is, fortunately, no need to attempt to 
resolve the issue between them here. 
 
5. An objection considered 
 Some philosophers see recourse to any sort of considerations about language, 
in tacking questions of ontology, as entirely misguided. As philosophers we are, or 
should be, concerned with what kinds of things there are in the world, that has nothing 
essentially to do with how we talk, or the words we use, save in the special case in 
which we are concerned with the existence of linguistic entities themselves19
                                                 
19 Here are two quite recent examples. John Heil attacks what he terms the ‘Picture Theory’, to which 
he takes philosophers who approach ontology via the study of language to be committed: “The core 
idea is that the character of reality can be ‘read off’ linguistic representations of reality. A corollary of 
the Picture Theory is the idea that to every meaningful predicate there corresponds a property. If, like 
me, you think that properties (if they exist) must be mind independent, if, that is, you are ontologically 
serious about properties, you will find unappealing the idea that we can discover the properties by 
scrutinizing features of our language.” (Heil 2003, p. 6) Heather Dyke, following Heil’s lead, inveighs 
against what she terms the ‘the representational fallacy’: “Much recent and contemporary work in 
metaphysics takes itself to be investigating the fundamental nature and structure of reality. One of the 
most widely used methodologies in pursuing that aim involves taking language about the world, either 
ordinary language, or some modified version of it, as our starting point and asking what we can learn 
about the world by examining that language....I call that methodology into question, arguing that it is a 
fallacy to argue from facts about language to conclusions about the fundamental nature of reality, one 
that is widely committed. I call it “the representational fallacy”. (Dyke 2007, p. 1). Heil’s and Dyke’s 
attacks on the ‘linguistic’ approach are critically assessed by Matti Eklund in a recent paper (Eklund 
2009) 
. With 
obvious and minor exceptions (such as washing machines, television sets, buildings, 
and other artifacts), the things we believe there are are things whose existence we 
believe to be entirely independent of ours and our activities—things which would 
have existed even if intelligent, language-using creatures had never evolved, or had 
never developed the means for talking or thinking about them. To think otherwise is 
either to embrace a radically implausible form of idealism, or to fall victim to some 
kind of insanity.   
 12 
 Since so much seems little more than the plainest common sense, no view that 
denies it can expect to gain many converts. In particular, if the Fregean approach 
really does entail that answers to questions about what kinds of things there are are 
objectionably language- and so mind-dependent, it should be rejected. I would accept 
that my preliminary statement of the approach lends some colour to this objection, but 
I think closer scrutiny reveals that it is misdirected. In brief, I shall argue (in section 
6) that there is no serious alternative to relying upon the analysis of language in 
explaining ontological categories, and so in framing ontological questions, and (in 
section 7) that reliance on the analysis of language in framing ontological questions 
need not involve any objectionable reliance on contingent facts about language in 
answering them. 
 
6. A response begun 
 How, if not by reference to the kinds of expression by means of which we 
refer to them, are we to explain suitably general concepts of object (or particular, or 
individual) and property and relation (or universals)? Can one explain these notions 
in a language-independent way? Evidently it is no good pointing to sample concrete 
objects and saying ‘Objects are things like those’. Prescinding from obvious 
difficulties about what constitutes relevant similarity to the samples, it is quite unclear 
how, from such an explanation, one could come by a concept of object which allows 
for objects which could not be objects of ostension—because too large, or too small, 
or not spatially located at all. But a concept of object which did not allow for such 
instances would already involve a potentially question-begging restriction. Bertrand 
Russell explains the notions of particular and universal as follows: 
 
 We speak of whatever is given in sensation, or is of the same nature as things 
given in sensation, as a particular; by opposition to this, a universal will be anything 
which may be shared by many particulars…20
 
 
Without the qualification ‘…or is of the same nature …’, this explanation of 
particular would be objectionable for essentially the same reason as an explanation of 
object as what occupies a definite region of space-time—i.e. it would be question-
beggingly restrictive. But we are given no clue what is required for something to be of 
                                                 
20 Russell 1912, p.93 
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the same nature as what is given in sensation, so the explanation is useless. 
Elsewhere21 Russell suggests that a particular may be defined as what exists at a time, 
but this is open to the same objection. In a later work, he proposes a very different 
definition: ‘particulars = terms of relations in atomic facts’22. There is, however, no 
obvious way to explain what an atomic fact is without recourse to the very notions we 
are trying to explain23
 
. In any case, Russell’s definition plainly presupposes the notion 
of a relation (which Russell understands as including properties as monadic relations). 
In a similar way, defining particulars as instances of universals (or combinations of 
universals) is no good unless one can independently explain what universals are. 
Saying that universals are things which are wholly present in different places at the 
same time suffers from at least two major problems—(1) it assumes that the only 
properties/universals are instantiated by spatio-temporal particulars/concrete objects, 
and so improperly forecloses on the question whether there are abstract 
objects/particulars; (2) it assumes that all properties/universals are instantiated by 
particulars—i.e. it provides only for first-level properties/universals, and fails to 
provide for higher-level properties/universals. Considerations of this kind cannot, of 
course, constitute a proof—but they strongly suggest that we are unlikely to be able to 
frame suitably general characterizations of objects, properties, and relations save in 
terms of the kinds of expressions that stand for them. 
7. The response completed 
  Does the fact—assuming it to be one—that we cannot adequately explain what 
objects, properties, etc., are without reliance upon a prior division of expressions into 
logical categories mean that answers to questions about what kinds of things there are 
must be objectionably language- and so mind-dependent?  
 There are two points to be made here. The first is that it would be a gross 
misrepresentation of the Fregean approach to claim that it makes the answers to 
questions about what kinds of things there are wholly a matter of the analysis of 
                                                 
21 Russell 1911, p.106 
22 Russell 1918, p.199 
23 Russell informally characterises them (op.cit., p.198) as facts consisting ‘in the possession of a 
quality by some particular thing’, or in the obtaining of a relation between two or more particulars. Of 
course, one might explain what atomic facts are in terms of the kind of sentences by means of which 
such facts can be stated—sentences devoid of logical operators. But, since logical operators include 
quantifiers, one can hardly expect to be able to explain what they are, or how they may be recognized 
as such, without first explaining what singular terms are, and how they are to be recognized. 
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language. To think it does so is to overlook the crucial point that, on the Fregean 
approach, whether or not there exist, say, objects of some specified kind—for 
example, numbers—turns upon whether there are true statements of an appropriate 
sort, viz. true statements featuring expressions functioning as singular terms which, if 
they have reference at all, refer to objects of that kind (e.g. to numbers). As noted, not 
just any true statements qualify as being of an appropriate sort—roughly, what is 
required is that they be statements of a sort which could not be true unless the relevant 
singular terms refer (which can in turn be seen as a matter of their occurring in 
positions open to existential generalization). But the important point, for present 
purposes, is that while the status of the relevant ingredient expressions as singular 
terms is a matter for the logical analysis of those statements, their truth-values will 
not, save in special cases, be so, and can be an entirely language- and mind-
independent matter. For example, whether the numerals in ‘3 + 5 = 8’ function as 
singular terms is a matter of the correct logical analysis of that statement, but nothing 
in the Fregean approach to ontology requires that its truth-value should be so24
 This point is enough to dispose of the charge that the Fregean approach 
improperly reduces ontological questions to questions about language, but not enough 
to answer the equally grave complaint that it renders the answers to such questions 
objectionably language- and so mind-dependent. The complaint, if taken as directed 
against our rough and preliminary statement of the Fregean approach, is perfectly fair. 
For although we have been careful to avoid claiming that the existence of true 
statements involving expressions of the appropriate type is a necessary—as distinct 
from merely sufficient—condition for the existence of entities of a given category, we 
have not been careful enough elsewhere. In particular, in explaining the ontological 
categories of object and property, we have said that objects are what singular terms 
stand for, and that properties are what predicates stand for. It should be clear that 
these explanations are no more than first, rough approximations. Taken as any more 
than that, they are obviously objectionable, since they would then make the existence 
of objects and properties depend upon the actual existence of suitable singular terms 
and predicates. What objects and properties there are would then be relative to 
language—not (or not necessarily) in the sense that relative to different languages, 
.  
                                                 
24 Of course, if the view for which Frege himself argued in Grundlagen (Frege 1884) can be upheld, 
elementary arithmetic truths will be analytic—but whether that is so is clearly a further issue, on which 
the Fregean approach to ontology is itself neutral. 
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there would be different objects and properties, but in the equally objectionable sense 
that there would be no objects and properties other than those which are the referents 
of some suitable expressions in some actual language or other. And since languages 
depend for their existence on language users, what objects and properties there are 
would be a mind-dependent matter. 
 This difficulty calls, not for rejection of the Fregean approach—indeed, if the 
argument of the preceding section is sound, there is no satisfactory alternative to it—
but for a more careful statement. The required adjustment is simple and obvious 
enough, but involves a momentous step. To say that objects are what singular terms 
stand for, taken strictly, implies that all objects have names, and so fails to allow for 
nameless objects. Surely there are—and clearly there could be—objects which are 
not, as a matter of contingent fact, the referents of any actual singular terms. To allow 
for such objects, we must say that objects are—not what singular terms stand for, 
but—what singular terms could stand for. To be an object is to be the referent of a 
possible singular term, to be a (first-level) property is to be the referent of a possible 
(first-level) predicate, and similarly for other cases25
 
. In short, we can avoid an 
objectionable relativity of ontology to the contingencies of actual languages by means 
of an essentially modal explanation of what objects, properties, etc., are—an 
explanation which transcends the contingent limitations of actual languages by 
drawing upon their possible extensions. 
8. Further complications and refinements 
 It is time to return to the difficulty, briefly aired at the close of section 3, 
caused by the fact that in English and other natural languages, there is no syntactic 
differentiation between the expression of first-level generality and generality of 
higher-level. In a formal language employing the quantifier-variable notation, the 
difference is easily marked by the use of different styles of variable—thus we write 
∃xFx to express the first-level existential generalization of Fa, but ∃FFa to express its 
second-level existential generalization. In English, however, generality is nearly 
always expressed, regardless of level, by means of indefinite pronouns such as 
‘something’ or ‘everything’, or noun-phrases like ‘some cat(s)’ or ‘every number’. 
                                                 
25 Talk of possible singular terms and possible predicates is a convenient shorthand. I am not assuming 
that there are merely possible singular terms as well as actual ones. In longhand, the thesis is that to be 
an object is to be something for which there is or could be a singular term. 
 16 
Thus the most natural ways to read ∃xFx and ∃FFa back into English are probably 
‘Something is F’ and  ‘a is something’ or ‘There is something a is’—using the same 
nominal quantifier word, regardless of level. Corresponding to this bias in favour of 
nominal quantification, there is a lack of syntactic differentiation between predicates 
of different levels. We say, for example, both that tigers are fierce and that tigers are 
rare—leaving the difference between the first-level predicate ‘are fierce’ and the 
second-level predicate ‘are rare’ completely unmarked syntactically. As we observed, 
this lack of differentiation between predicates of different levels complicates the 
extension of the Fregean explanation of ontological categories to properties and 
relations of higher-level. We can still say, for example, that second-level properties 
are what (actual or possible) second-level predicates stand for, but, since we cannot 
tell second-level predicates apart from first-level predicates on the basis of their form, 
this explanation does not enable us to recognize candidate second-level properties 
unless supplemented with a further explanation of how second-level predicates are to 
be recognized as such26
 The difficulties caused by the lack of any straightforward syntactic 
differentiation, in natural languages, between levels of generality and predicates of 
different level are, however, more serious and far-reaching than we have so far 
acknowledged. For a natural corollary of the use of indefinite pronouns such as 
‘something’, ‘everything’, etc., to express higher- as well as first-level generality is 
that we may specify instances of second- or higher-level generalizations by means of 
definite noun-phrases. Thus once we have expressed the second-order existential 
generalization of ‘Sally and Mary are both flautists’ by ‘There is something (some 
property) which Mary and Sally have in common’, we can hardly avoid answering the 
query ‘What?’ or ‘Which property?’ by ‘The property of being a flautist’. More 
generally, in English—in contrast with the Begriffsschrift and other higher-order 
languages employing the quantifier-variable notation—we may refer to properties and 
relations by means of definite noun-phrases of the type ‘the property of being …’, or  
‘the relation of …’, where ‘…’ is filled by an adjective (e.g. ‘wise’) or a noun-phrase 
.  
                                                 
26 Such a further explanation might draw on inferential tests. For example, the inference from ‘Fs are 
Gs’ and ‘a is an F’ to ‘a is G’ is valid when F and G are both first-level, but fails when G is second-
level—we cannot infer from ‘English Baroque churches are rare’ and ‘St.Mary Woolnoth is an English 
Baroque church’ to ‘St.Mary Woolnoth is rare’. A related non-inferential mark is that the explicitly 
quantified forms ‘All Fs are G’ and ‘Some Fs are G’ are inadmissible, when G is second-level—we 
can say ‘English Baroque churches are rare’, but not ‘All English Baroque churches are rare’. 
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(e.g. ‘an aardvark’) or a gerund (e.g. ‘loving’). But this—as a moment’s reflection 
discloses—leads straight to trouble for our Fregean explanation of objects as the 
referents of (actual or possible) singular terms. At least, it does so if one holds, as 
Frege seems to have done, that object and property must be wholly disjoint 
categories27
 
. That is: 
 (a) objects are what actual or possible non-empty singular terms stand for 
 (b) no property is an object 
 (c)  some expressions of the form ‘the property of being F’ are non-empty 
  singular terms 
 (d) if an expression of the form ‘the property of being F’ stands for  
  anything, it stands for a property  
  
form an inconsistent quartet—so we cannot endorse all four.  
 Our problem is, of course, a re-run of the so-called ‘paradox’ of the concept 
horse—that the concept horse is an object, and so not a concept—discussed by Frege 
in ‘On Concept and Object’. As Frege there expresses the difficulty, it is that ‘[b]y a 
kind of necessity of language, my expressions, taken literally, sometimes miss my 
thought; I mention an object, when what I intend is a concept’.28  If we assume, as I 
think we should, that it is not an option to deny (d), we can retain (a) as it stands only 
by denying one of (b) and (c). Frege himself appears to be firmly committed to (a) 
and (b), and to have proposed to solve the problem by denying (c). According to 
Michael Dummett29, Frege argued that we should dispense altogether with the terms 
‘concept’30
                                                 
27 ‘property’ is not, of course, Frege’s word—he calls the referents of predicates ‘concepts’, but I prefer 
‘property’ as less misleading, in view of the prevalent philosophical use of ‘concept’ for something 
more like Fregean sense. Frege’s view that objects and properties are disjoint is a special case of his 
view that complete and incomplete (unsaturated) expressions must refer, respectively, to complete and 
incomplete entities. See Dummett 1973, chs.3-8  
, ‘relation’ and ‘function’ as being ‘quite unsuitable for the work they were 
supposed to do’, and that the corresponding predicates ‘ξ is a concept’, ‘ξ is a 
28 Frege 1892, p.193 
29 See Dummett 1973, pp.211-22. According to Dummett, soon after publishing ‘Über Begriff und 
Gegenstand’, Frege submitted to the same journal another article resolving the paradox, but it was 
rejected, and the article appears to have been lost. I am relying on Dummett’s reconstruction of Frege’s 
solution, based upon his apparent memory of having read the unpublished essay in Frege’s Nachlass. 
30  We may assume Frege would have rejected the use of the term ‘property’ for the same reason. See 
footnote 19.  
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relation’ and ‘ξ is a function’ should be rejected as mere pseudo-predicates 31
 This is not the occasion for a full-scale discussion of this subtle proposal
. In 
contrast with the genuine predicate ‘ξ is an object’, which cannot yield a false 
sentence when its argument place is filled by an expression of the appropriate type 
(i.e. a singular term), the pseudo-predicates have the opposite property—since their 
argument places can only be filled by singular terms (which must stand, if for 
anything, for objects), they cannot be completed to form true sentences. The problem 
is that if the pseudo-predicates were genuine predicates at all, they could only be first-
level predicates. But a predicate that did the work ‘ξ is a concept’ is supposed to do, if 
it is to be strictly analogous ‘ξ is an object’, would have to be such that its argument 
place requires to be filled by a first-level predicate, and when so filled, never yields a 
false sentence. That is, it would have to be a second-level predicate. Having rejected 
‘concept’ and ‘ξ is a concept’, we should likewise reject apparent singular terms of 
the form ‘the concept horse’ or ‘the concept for which “ξ is a horse” stands’ as 
equally spurious.  
32
 Crispin Wright, who rejects the Frege-Dummett proposal for somewhat 
different reasons
. 
Here I shall simply observe that the Frege-Dummett proposal takes it for granted that 
only objects can be the referents of singular terms—i.e. that if a a singular term refers 
to anything, it refers to an object. Without this assumption, there is no warrant for the 
claims that ‘ξ is an object’ can never be completed so as to yield a falsehood, and that 
‘ξ is a concept’ can never be completed so as to yield a truth. Of course, the 
assumption follows from (a). My point is that the Frege-Dummett rejection of ‘ξ is a 
concept’, etc., as pseudo-predicates depends on acceptance of the strong Fregean 
doctrine that no entity can be referred to by expressions of different logical types. I do 
not see any compelling reason why we should, in the present context, treat that 
assumption as sacrosanct. 
33
                                                 
31 Dummett 1973, p.213 
, argues—in effect—that we should deny (b). Wright contends that 
32 What I have summarised is, of course, only the negative part of the Frege-Dummett proposal. The 
positive part claims that we can say, non-paradoxically, what ‘the concept horse is a concept’ tries to 
say, by using what Dummett calls predicative expressions. These are expressions like ‘what “ξ is a 
horse” stands for’ as it is used in ‘Shergar is what “ξ is a horse” stands for’—equivalent to ‘Shergar is a 
horse’—in contrast with ‘what Smith has in his hand’ (as used in ‘what Smith has in his hand is a 
grenade’). The requisite second-level predicate—to be used in place if the spurious ‘ξ is a concept’—is 
then something like ‘… is something which everything either is or is not’. 
33 See Wright 1998, pp.77-85.  
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a satisfactory dissolution of the paradox should respect several constraints, including 
these two: 
(iii) The account should respect the Reference Principle: sameness of reference 
should ensure sameness of semantic role, so that co-referential expressions should 
be cross-substitutable salva veritate in extensional contexts, and salva congruitate 
in general. 
… 
(v)  The account should avoid the need to treat any range of expressions as Frege’s 
proposal treats ‘the concept horse’, that is, as referring, if to anything, then to 
something other than their sense intuitively dictates reference.34
 
 
Wright’s principal complaint against the Frege-Dummett proposal is that it violates 
the Reference Principle. For according to the proposal ‘ξ is a horse’ and ‘what “ξ is a 
horse” stands for’ co-refer—yet they are plainly not interchangeable salva congruitate 
in any contexts, since, for example, the result of substituting the latter for the former 
in ‘Shergar is a horse’—viz. ‘Shergar what “ξ is a horse” stands for’—is ill-formed35
His own view is that we can, pace Frege and Dummett, refer to Fregean concepts (i.e. 
properties) by means of expressions such as ‘the concept horse’, but that we cannot—
on pain of violating the Reference Principle—take them to be the referents of first-
level predicates, such as ‘is a horse’. We need, he proposes, a distinction between 
reference and ascription—while ‘Shergar’ refers to, or stands for, Shergar, ‘is a horse’ 
ascribes (but does not refer to) being a horse or the property of being a horse. Since 
that property is the referent of a singular term (e.g. ‘the property of being a horse’), it 
is an object. Since properties, on this view, are a kind of object, there is no call to 
infer, from the fact that the property of being a horse is an object, that it is not a 
property. So the paradox is dissolved
.  
36
 This is, as far as I can see, an effective way out of Frege’s paradox. But it 
comes at some cost. It is true enough, as Wright says
. 
37
                                                 
34 Wright 1998, pp.76-7. There are three other constraints, but they need not concern us here. 
, that we can still distinguish 
between objects and properties—all objects whatever are, as such, possible objects of 
reference, but properties, in contrast with other objects, may be both referred to and 
35 This is a simplified—but I hope not over-simplified—statement of Wright’s objection. As Wright 
notes, the likely Dummettian response is that ill-formedness in this case is merely superficial, resulting 
as it does from the absence of the copula, which is, on Frege’s view, ‘a merely grammatical device, 
with no content’ (cf Dummett 1981, p.216). But as Wright argues, the thesis that the copula is 
syntactically irrelevant is ad hoc and hard to square with Frege’s thesis that predicates and relational 
expressions are essentially incomplete. See Wright, op.cit.,pp.80-1 
 
36 This is the briefest summary of Wright’s solution—for details, see Wright 1998, pp.84-8 
37 Wright 1998, p.90 
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ascribed. But precisely because properties are, on this account, a subclass of objects, 
they no longer constitute a separate category—at least, not if distinct categories must 
be disjoint. That is one cost. A related concern is that if Wright’s proposal is to be 
implemented in a fully general fashion, it must be applied to incomplete expressions 
across the board—not just to predicates (of each level), but also to relational 
expressions (again, at every level), and to other kinds of functional expression, 
including term-forming functors and sentential operators. Thus we should agree that 
we can refer to a certain function by means of ‘the function which takes each number 
to its square’, and to another by means of ‘the function of propositions which takes 
the value truth if and only both its arguments are true’, and that these functions, along 
with all other functions, are objects. But we should deny that ‘the square of ξ’ and ‘ξ 
and ζ’ refer to these functions. But what do they do to them? ‘the square of 17’ does 
not ascribe being a square to anything, and ‘grass is green and the sky is blue’ does 
not ascribe being a conjunction to anything. It seems that we must find, or postulate, 
further relations between functional expressions and functions, analogous to but other 
than that of ascription. A second cost—at least from a Fregean perspective—is that  
we cannot think, as Frege thought he could, of there being a single semantic relation 
between expressions and what, for want of a better term, we may call their non-
linguistic correlates. Since every entity can be an object of reference by means of a 
singular term, no expression outside the category of singular terms can refer to any 
entity—else we should have a violation of the Reference Principle. So reference 
cannot be such a relation. But if the Reference Principle is well-motivated, it seems 
that any candidate to be such a universal semantic relation—i.e. a relation that each 
expression bears to its non-linguistic correlate, if it has one—should satisfy an 
analogue of the Reference Principle. For example, if we say that each expression has 
its non-linguistic correlate as its semantic value, we should expect that if two 
expressions have the same semantic value, they should be interchangeable salva 
veritate in extensional contexts and salva congruitate in all. But the semantic value of 
a singular term just is its referent, and any entity is the semantic value of some 
singular term. Thus if an entity were the semantic value of an expression other than a 
singular term, there would be a violation of the analogue of the Reference Principle. 
Hence ‘ξ has ζ as semantic value’ cannot express the universal semantic relation.  
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I do not wish to claim that these points are decisive reasons against Wright’s proposal. 
But they are, I think, enough to make it worth exploring the remaining option—
rejecting (a). 
 Of course, simply rejecting (a) is tantamount to scrapping the Fregean 
approach altogether. But, at least if we accept—pace Dummett-Frege and Wright—
that entities may be referred to by expressions belonging to different logical types, 
there is a simple and plausible modification of (a) which avoids our problem whilst 
preserving the essential ideas of the Fregean approach. Where there are expressions of 
different logical types having reference to entities of a given kind, we distinguish 
between primary and secondary, or derivative, modes of reference to them. For 
example, while we can refer to properties by means of (complex) singular terms (such 
as terms of the form: the property of being something that φs), the basic mode of 
reference is by means of the incomplete predicate ‘φ(…)’; we can refer to the truth-
function of conjunction, say, in just that way, using a name for it, but the basic mode 
of reference to it is by means of the incomplete expression: ‘… and ___’; and 
similarly for other cases. We then replace (a) by  
(a′) objects are what are primarily referred to by actual or possible non-empty 
 singular terms  
 
making similar adjustments in the counterparts of (a) for entities of other kinds. Thus 
in particular, we have 
 
(propertiesn) nth level properties are what are primarily referred to by actual or  
 possible predicates of level n 
 
Our revised explanations allow that entities of a given category may be referred to by 
expressions other than those of the type in terms of which the category is defined. 
Thus a first-level property such as that of being a horse may be referred to by singular 
term (such as the one just used), but because that it not the primary mode of reference 
to properties, it does not make objects of them, and so precipitates no conflict with (b) 
(or, of course, (c) or (d)). 
 Since this modified Fregean approach involves accepting that expressions of 
different logical types (e.g. singular terms and predicates) may refer to the same entity 
(e.g. the same property), in spite of the fact that those expressions are not 
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interchangeable salva congruitate (let alone salva veritate), it requires rejection of 
Wright’s Reference Principle. As Wright observes, a restricted form of the principle is 
indisputable: no one should deny that expressions of the same syntactic category 
which coincide in their reference must be interchangeable salva veritate in 
extensional contexts—for as he says, extensional contexts are by definition those in 
which truth-value is determined by the reference of component expressions. And I 
think one could add that expressions of the same syntactic category must be 
interchangeable salva congruitate in all contexts—for being thus interchangeable is 
determinative of sameness of syntactic category. But why should we insist upon the 
unrestricted principle, proscribing sameness of reference for expressions belonging to 
different syntactic categories? Wright himself entertains the possibility that the 
unrestricted principle might be rejected, and makes no claim that rejecting must result 
in disaster: ‘I think the truth is not that disaster attends this proposal, but that it is 
unlikely in the end to point to any purpose in its distinction from the alternative I have 
been sketching’38
 
. As against this, it seems to me that there are significant differences 
between my modified Fregean approach and Wright’s alternative proposal. To claim 
it as an advantage of my approach over Wright’s that it allows for the ascription of 
reference to expressions of different syntactic categories—to predicates and 
functional expressions as well as singular terms—would perhaps be somewhat 
question-begging in this context. But the other costs of Wright’s alternative, noted a 
couple of paragraphs ago, are avoided by my modification. 
 9. Existence—the bearable lightness of being 
 I should like to conclude with some observations on the conception of 
ontology and ontological commitment that results from adopting the broadly Fregean 
approach I have been advocating here. 
 Semantically speaking, a singular term is one that serves, if all goes well, to 
refer to a particular thing39
                                                 
38 Wright 1998, p.89 
. But all may not go well. Singular terms, at least on fairly 
standard views of the matter, may fail to refer. It follows that the mere existence of a 
range of singular terms cannot suffice for the existence of corresponding entities. This 
is why, on the broadly Fregean approach I am defending, we have taken, as a 
39 ‘thing’ not ‘object’—in earlier work (e.g. Hale 1987, pp.12 and 15) I have tended to characterize 
singular terms as ones whose function is to refer to objects. As explained in the last few paragraphs, I 
now think that singular terms may be used to refer to entities belonging to other categories 
 23 
sufficient condition for the existence of objects of some specified kind, that there be 
true statements essentially involving expressions functioning as singular terms which, 
if they refer at all, refer to objects of that kind. The underlying idea, of course, is that 
the relevant statements could not be true unless their ingredient singular terms 
successfully discharged their semantic function, and so had reference. As we have 
seen, a more precise statement of this sufficient condition would require that the 
relevant true statements be logically simple (or atomic), and also that they should be 
extensional contexts of the relevant singular terms40. And in view of the possibility of 
singular terms referring to entities of other types—such as properties and relations—it 
would also be necessary to stipulate that the relevant singular terms should be the 
primary vehicles of reference to the entities for which they stand. I shall leave these 
qualifications to be understood in what follows41
 As we saw, we cannot take this sufficient condition to be necessary, if we are 
to leave room—as we surely must—for nameless objects. To be an object is to be 
something to which we could primarily refer by means of a singular term, actual or 
possible. The formulation, within this approach, of a condition necessary as well as 
sufficient for the existence of objects is a matter of some delicacy. We cannot say that 
there are objects of a specified kind if and only if there could be true atomic 
statements configuring singular terms of an appropriate sort. For this condition would 
be met if there actually are singular terms of an appropriate sort, but as a matter of 
contingent fact, no atomic statements involving them are true. Intuitively, however, 
this would be a situation in which there are no objects of the kind in question, 
although there could have been. I think the condition we need should run somewhat as 
follows: there exist objects of a specified kind if and only if (i) there are or could be 
singular terms which would, if non-empty, refer to objects of that kind and (ii) if there 
were such terms, there would be true atomic statements containing them. The idea 
behind this admittedly somewhat awkward formulation is that objects of the kind in 
.  
                                                 
40 On most views, the truth of ‘O’Reilly believes that Vulcan causes the perihelion of Mercury’ does 
not demand the existence of the supposed intra-Mercurial planet Vulcan. One might hold that such 
examples are already excluded by the requirement that the containing true statement be atomic, taking 
the fact ‘Vulcan causes the perihelion of Mercury’ is embedded in a larger statement to ensure that the 
latter is non-atomic. But the restriction to extensional contexts is still needed to exclude cases such as 
‘Alcibiades worshipped Zeus’ 
41 If we agree with Frege that reference-failure is contagious, and in particular, that a singular term’s 
failure to refer deprives any sentence that contains it of truth-value, we could drop the requirement that 
the relevant sentential contexts be true and atomic, in favour of the weaker requirement that they be 
true or false. But Frege’s view is somewhat controversial, and I shall not rely on it here. 
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question exist provided only that all that stands in the way of there being true 
statements configuring terms for them is that as a matter of contingent fact, our 
language lacks suitable singular terms.  
 If we turn now to what is necessary and sufficient for the existence of 
properties, an answer strictly analogous to the condition we’ve just proposed for the 
existence of objects would have it that there are properties of a specified kind if and 
only if (i) there are or could be predicates which would, if they have reference at all, 
refer to properties of that kind and (ii) if there were such predicates, there would be 
true atomic statements containing them. Once again, the underlying idea would be 
that all that stands in the way of our making the relevant true statements is a 
contingent lack of suitable predicates to refer to the relevant properties. The proposed 
condition therefore rules out uninstantiated properties—it embodies what we might 
term an Aristotelian conception of properties (universals in rebus, as opposed to 
universals ante res). But there is, in my view, no compelling reason to proscribe 
empty, or even necessarily empty, properties. So I think we should, and can, adopt a 
significantly weaker condition.  
 One way to relax our overly demanding condition would be to replace the 
requirement for true atomic statements by true or false atomic statements. Relaxing 
the requirement in this way would make good sense if one took Frege’s view that 
reference-failure is upwardly contagious (i.e. infects any complex expression having 
the empty term as a part). But there is a simpler and more sweeping remedy. We 
should take the existence of a significant predicate simpliciter as a sufficient condition 
for the existence of a corresponding property, and the possibility of such a predicate 
as necessary and sufficient. In fact one can argue that the two conditions are 
equivalent. For a predicate is significant if and only if there is associated with it a 
condition for its application (i.e. a satisfaction condition—in the case of a first-level 
predicate, a condition necessary and sufficient for it to be true of an object). Let φ be 
any of the predicates in question, and let t be any non-empty term suitable to fill φ’s 
argument place. Suppose φt is true or false. Then φ must be significant. Conversely, 
suppose φ is significant. Then either the object t denotes meets the satisfaction 
condition associated with φ or not. If so, φt is true, and if not φt is false, so either way, 
φt is true or false. 
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 If we adopt this sufficient condition42 for the existence of properties, and 
construct a necessary and sufficient condition in the obvious way, there is a striking 
asymmetry between objects and properties—while the bare existence of meaningful 
singular terms is insufficient for the existence of objects, the bare existence of 
meaningful predicates is sufficient for the existence of properties. I think there is a 
simple way to explain and justify this asymmetry. A singular term’s being 
meaningful—having a sense—consists in there being an associated condition for an 
object or other entity to be its referent. It is obviously entirely consistent with this that 
that condition should go unfulfilled. A first-level predicate’s being meaningful 
likewise consists in its being associated with a condition—this time, a condition for 
an arbitrary object to satisfy the predicate. And, of course, this condition will in 
general be one that can go unfulfilled. But one perfectly defensible notion of a 
property simply identifies properties with the satisfaction conditions associated with 
(actual or possible) predicates. For there to be a certain property is just for there to be 
a condition that things have to meet if they are to have the property, and since every 
meaningful predicate is eo ipso associated with such a condition, there is a property 
corresponding to every meaningful predicate. This abundant conception contrasts 
with the sparse view(s) favoured by some metaphysicians43
 Uncle Bill is fast asleep in a deckchair on Brighton beach while His Holiness 
 the Pope is addressing the faithful from his balcony in St. Peter’s Basilica 
. On the abundant view, 
very little is required for the existence of a property. Take any meaningful sentence, 
say: 
 
                                                 
42 As it stands, the condition is not strictly sufficient. For one may construct perfectly meaningful first-
level predicates embedding empty singular terms—e.g. ‘is John’s favourite colour’ (as is might be used 
in ‘Your shirt is John’s favourite colour’) which may fail to stand for any property because there is no 
such person as John, or because there is no one colour which is his favourite. Thus a more qualified 
formulation is needed. I shall pass over this complication here. 
43 The terminology is borrowed from Lewis (1983 and 1986). The distinction is in Armstrong (1979), 
Bealer (1982) and Swoyer (1996). There is a useful overview in Mellor and Oliver (1997). Crispin 
Wright and I adopt it in Hale & Wright 2009a, where the distinction is briefly discussed at pp.197-8. 
Lewis contrasts properties as abundant with sparse universals, but he is not endorsing the abundant 
conception of property advocated here. Lewis simply identifies properties with sets or classes of 
things—the property of being a donkey, for Lewis, is the class of actual and merely possible donkeys 
(or as he would prefer to put it, this-wordly and other-worldly donkeys). From the present standpoint, 
Lewis is probably best understood as  advocating that we do without properties in favour of classes. 
Neither the difference, nor the issue, is merely terminological. Lewisian ‘properties’ diverge from 
properties in our sense, for Lewis is compelled to identify properties which necessarily have the same 
instances—e.g. the intuitively quite different properties of being a prime larger than any other prime 
and of being a common divisor of 15 and 16 are just one and the same property for Lewis, as are those 
of being triangular and being trilateral. 
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and remove from it one or more occurrences of singular terms, and you get an 
expression standing for a property, such as the property of being-fast-asleep-in-a-
deckchair-on-Brighton-beach-while-His Holiness-the-Pope-is-addressing-the-
faithful-from-his-balcony-in-St.Peter’s-Basilica. Friends of sparse properties may 
balk at this way of understanding properties as too generous. No genuine property of 
uncle Bill, they will say, is something he could lose merely as a result of something’s 
happening hundreds of miles away—say His Holiness the Pope’s leaving his balcony. 
The genuine properties are, perhaps, those which somehow match up with the ‘joints 
in nature’—those which underlie the surface appearances that lead us to classify some 
thing as gold, or water, such the being the element with 79 protons in its nucleus or 
being H2O—or those which have a serious rôle to play in formulating its laws, or 
some such. If all sparse theorists really want to claim is that there is some narrower 
notion of property which they find more interesting, or think is more useful for certain 
purposes, we should have no quarrel with them. There may well be perfectly good, 
more restrictive notions of property. If they mean the undemanding, abundant notion 
is either illegitimate or too generous to be of any philosophical interest, I disagree. I 
think it is clear enough, and that it need not be seen as in competition with sparser 
notions—indeed, the sparser notions of property are best explained in terms of it, by 
restriction. Further, I think it does have philosophically useful work to do—to give 
just one central example which I cannot develop here, in providing an interpretation 
of second- and higher-order logics under which their existential commitments are 
very much less problematic than they are often taken to be44
 What I am calling the abundant conception of properties might just as 
appropriately be described as deflationary, or metaphysically lightweight—hence my 
title. It takes as sufficient for the existence of a property what one might reasonably 
see as the bare minimum required to distinguish properties from entities of other 
.  
                                                 
44 A particularly clear expression of this concern can be found in Charles Parsons’s classic paper on 
Frege’s theory of number. He writes: ‘The justification for not assimilating higher-order logic to set 
theory would have to be an ontological theory like Frege’s theory of concepts as fundamentally 
different from objects, because “unsaturated”. But even then there are distinctions among higher-order 
logics which are comparable to the differences in strength of set theories. Higher-order logics have 
existential commitments. Consider the full second-order predicate calculus, in which we can define 
concepts by quantification over all concepts. If a formula is interpreted so that the first-order variables 
range over a class D of objects, then in interpreting the second-order variables we must assume a well-
defined domain of concepts applying to objects in D which, if it is not literally the domain of all 
concepts over D, is comprehensive enough to be closed under quantification. Both formally and 
epistemologically, this presupposition is comparable to the assumption which gives rise to both the 
power and the difficulty of set theory, that the class of all subclasses of a given class exists’ Parsons 
1965, pp.166-7 
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categories—a condition which things of the appropriate sort, depending on the level 
of the property, may or may not meet, contingently or as a matter of necessity. 
Briefly, properties are ways for things to be—ways things could be or, on the most 
abundant conception, ways things could not be45
 Modulo the small but important extra demand that (actual or possible) singular 
terms figure in some true atomic contexts, the conception of objects I am defending is 
equally deflationary or metaphysically lightweight. In parallel with the abundant 
conception of properties, it takes as sufficient for the existence of an object what one 
might reasonably see as the bare minimum required to distinguish objects from 
entities of other categories—the possibility of being an object of identifying or 
individuating thought or reference. Just as with the abundant conception of properties, 
there need be no competition between this conception and more restrictive ones—
obvious restrictions being to objects occupying regions of space-time, or figuring in 
energy exchanges or causal interactions of some other sort—provided that they are 
acknowledged to be such, i.e. restrictions of the more general and deflationary 
conception. As with properties, philosophers enamoured of sparser conceptions of 
objects may feel that the deflationary conception makes being an object too easy for it 
to be of any philosophical interest or importance. I think they would be wrong—that 
like the abundant conception of properties, it can do useful philosophical work. In 
particular, it can form the basis of a modest and sober platonism which allows us to 
take arithmetic and analysis, and a significant part of set theory, as true when taken at 
face value
.  
46,47
 
.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 This provides the basis of an agreeably deflationary account of possible world semantics—including 
extensions of it to encompass so-called impossible worlds. Whether such extensions are needed, or 
well-motivated, or have the philosophical significance that some of their proponents claim for them, 
are, of course, further questions. 
46 This is a central claim of the neo-Fregean programme in the philosophy of mathematics which 
Crispin Wright and I have defended over many years. See, for example, Hale & Wright 2001, and more 
recently, Hale & Wright 2008, 2009a, 2009b, and Hale (forthcoming) 
47 I thank John Benson, Eric Olson, and Crispin Wright for helpful critical reactions to an earlier draft 
of this paper, and Jared Warren for very valuable bibilographical assistance. This paper was prepared 
during my tenure of a Leverhulme Senior Research Fellowship—I am very grateful to the Trust for its 
generous support of my work. 
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